The endogenous choice of timing is discussed in a vertically di®erenti-ated duopoly where quality improvement requires a¯xed convex cost. The timing decision concerns the quality stage. Using an extended game with observable delay, it is shown that only simultaneous equilibria can arise.
welfare of the timing of investment in product quality in a vertically di®erentiated duopoly where the market stage is played in the price space. They show that (a) sequential play induces both¯rms to invest less in product quality, as compared to what they would if they were to play simultaneously; (b) under sequential play, the leader prefers to supply the high-quality good; and (c) industry pro¯ts are higher under sequential play than under simultaneous play, while the opposite obviously holds for social welfare. Hence, the authors suggest that¯rms may enjoy coordination bene¯ts under sequential quality choice. Though, since thē rm supplying the high-quality good prefers sequential play to simultaneous play, while the opposite applies to the¯rm producing the low-quality good,¯rms can coordinate over sequential play if either (i) a side payment is possible; or (ii)¯rms discover and introduce new varieties at random. In the latter perspective, the authors identify a probability interval in which both¯rms prefer the sequential move game.
Although suggestive and indeed acceptable, neither of the two routes appear fully satisfactory, for di®erent reasons. The possibility of a side payment raises the issue of opportunistic behaviour on the part of both¯rms. As to the probabilistic approach, one would like to exploit it fully from the outset, and analyse the game as a stochastic R&D race. In the original paper, qualities are produced in a deterministic environment. Moreover, random success in R&D activity puts strongly into question point (b). If innovation is stochastic, there is no reason to believe a priori that the leader will supply the high-quality good. As an example, consider the car industry. An innovation in the form of a new family car in the range of station wagons may be easier to accomplish than a new°agship sportcar, so that the leader may well end up with the low-quality good. This points to a possible tradeo® between early innovation and the attainment of a dominant position in the market (see Dutta, Lach and Rustichini, 1995) .
1
My purpose is to proceed to a selection between simultaneous and sequential quality choice by embedding quality competition into an extended game with observable delay (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990 ; HS henceforth), where players (say, rms) are required to set both the actual moves or actions in the quality space, and the time at which such actions are to be implemented. When¯rms choose to act at di®erent times, sequential equilibria obtain, while if they decide to move at the same time, simultaneous Nash equilibria are observed. For sequential play to emerge at the subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended game, its outcome must at least weakly Pareto-dominate the outcome associated with simultaneous moves. The choice of timing occurs in a preplay stage which does not take place in real time, so that there is no discounting associated with waiting and payo®s are the same whether¯rms choose to move as soon as possible or they delay as long as they can. The decision to play early or at a later time is not su±cient per se to yield sequential play, since an analogous decision taken by the rival leads to simultaneous play. In the present setting, another extension can be envisaged, namely, the one concerning the choice between high and low quality, i.e., the relative positions of¯rms in the product space. Therefore, I shall describe two alternative symmetric extended games, resulting from the permutation of the stages describing the timing choice and the location of¯rms along the quality spectrum, respectively. It turns out that the subgame perfect equilibrium of both games entails simultaneous play at the quality stage, so that Stackelberg outcomes are ruled out. This result, which appears to be in contrast with¯rms' behaviour in the real world, may cast a shadow on the reliability of this approach as a stylised description of the process of innovation and entry.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The basic model of vertical di®erentiation is summarized in section 2. Section 3 describes the extended games.
Finally, section 4 provides concluding remarks.
The vertical di®erentiation model
Here I shall brie°y resume the basic setting. Two single-product¯rms, labelled as 1 and 2, produce goods of di®erent qualities, q 1 and q 2 2 [0; 1), through the same technology, C(q i ) = kq 
A slight generalization of Aoki and Prusa's results in terms of equilibrium qualities, pro¯t and social welfare can be given on the basis of (1) and (2). Depending on the entry sequence,¯rms will alternatively take the high-quality (H) or the low-quality (L) position. Table 1 summarises the outcomes associated with simultaneous play (n), sequential play with the high-quality¯rm leading (Hl), and sequential play with the low-quality¯rm leading (Ll), respectively.
The above inequalities imply that¯rms' choice of the respective roles is independent of the ratio between the size of the market and the amount of¯xed costs.
Moreover, on the basis of social welfare levels in the three cases, it is worth em-phasizing that a public agency taking care of social surplus without distributive concerns should favour the leadership by the low-quality¯rm, while the leader always prefer to enter with a superior quality. This di®erence in the structure of preferences can be traced back to the fact that, when leading, the low-qualitȳ rm provides a higher quality than in any other situation.
The extended game with observable delay
Consider the following generalization of the extended game proposed by HS (1990:
p. 32), where¯rms can set a single strategic variable in the basic game and must choose between moving¯rst or second. 4 HS (1990) also propose an extended game with action commitment, where each player must commit to a speci¯c action irrespectively of the rival trying to lead or follow. The equilibrium of such a game is never unique; in particular, it always allows for sequential moves (see their Theorem VII, p. 42).
2 g; where j = fn; lf; f lg denotes the outcome according to the timing combination. The set of times at which¯rms can choose to move is T = fF; Sg, i.e.,¯rst or second. The set of strategies for player i 2 I is § i = fF; Sg £ © i , where © i is the function that maps fT £ q 2 (or q 1 )g into q 1 (or q 2 ). If both¯rms choose to move at the same time, they obtain the payo®s associated with the simultaneous Nash equilibrium, otherwise they get the payo®s associated with the Stackelberg equilibrium, e.g., if 1 moves¯rst and 2 moves second, or vice versa. Finally, the presence of ¡k(q Proof. The¯rst extended game, where¯rms set the timing before proceeding to choose which quality to produce, is described by matrix 1. In each cell, the¯rst payo® refers to¯rm 1, the second to¯rm 2. The cells where payo®s are (¡; ¡) represent all cases where¯rms enter with identical quality, so that revenues are nil by virtue of the Bertrand paradox and each¯rm looses R&D costs.
INSERT MATRIX 1 HERE
On the basis of the inequalities in (3), matrix 1 can be easily reduced to a 2 £ 2 form, as follows. Consider the north-west quadrant, describing the subgame 5 It can be shown that the same result holds if¯rm i's total cost were C(q i ; x i ) = kx i q 2 i ; x i being the output level (see Lambertini, 1996) .
where both¯rms move as early as possible, and then choose which quality to supply. Both (L; H) and (H; L) are Nash equilibria of the subgame, therefore in the remainder I shall use the pro¯ts resulting from the correlated equilibrium, i.e., (¼ 
INSERT MATRIX 1b HERE
It immediately appears that F is a strictly dominant strategy for both¯rms, so that the subgame perfect equilibrium of this extended game is identi¯ed by the strategy pair (F; F ), entailing that both¯rms introduce their respective goods as early as possible, i.e., they play simultaneously in the quality stage. The equilibrium pro¯ts are those yielded by the correlated equilibrium of the fully simultaneous subgame, (0:064915µ 4 =k; 0:064915µ 4 =k).
Turn now to the extended game where¯rms¯rst decide over their location in the quality range, and then proceed to set the timing. This game is depicted in matrix 2.
INSERT MATRIX 2 HERE Matrix 2 can be reduced by the same method applied in the previous case, by analysing each quadrant in isolation. This yields matrix 2b. Even without any inference concerning¯rms' choices in the north-west and south-east quadrants of matrix 2, it is worth observing that matrix 2b looks as if¯rms were always moving at the earliest occasion.
INSERT MATRIX 2b HERE Matrix 2b exhibits two Nash equilibria, namely (H; L) and (L; H), where, again, rms move simultaneously. This obviously entails that as the representative payo® one may consider that associated with the correlated equilibrium identi¯ed above, while discussing matrix 1, i.e., (0:064915µ 4 =k; 0:064915µ 4 =k).
The result stated in Proposition 1 is clearly at odd with reality, where we usually observe¯rms entering sequentially. This leads to reassess the reliability of a one-shot model as a tool to describe real world events. On the one hand, the approach adopted by Aoki and Prusa (1997) lacks a solid game-theoretical basis;
on the other, the extended game approach adopted here excludes a result which we are well accustomed with in everyday's life. In either case, it appears that the essence of Stackelberg equilibria is their ability to capture the strategic use on the part of a¯rm of the information contained in the rival's reaction function in the relevant space, while a more°edged formalisation of both the innovation and the entry processes must take into account the role of real time and uncertainty in the R&D activity, as in Dutta, Lach and Rustichini (1995).
From a social standpoint, the above analysis entails a clearcut conclusion, namely, that strategic interaction drives¯rms towards an equilibrium which is collectively more desirable than the Stackelberg one where the high-quality¯rm takes the lead. Finally, the highest level of social welfare, which would be generated by appointing the low-quality¯rm as the leader, remains out of reach unless an intervention is designed to induce it. 
